

~~TS 172597~~
TS 172597

ILLEGIB

14 MAR 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General George S. Brown, USAF
Office of the Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT : Draft "Statement on Intelligence Debate"

I have reviewed the Department of Defense draft which you transmitted under covering memo of 9 March 1960, in which you requested concurrence in its declassification.

Although there is nothing significant in the draft statement which has not appeared in public on some authority or other, further official confirmation appearing in the press does to some extent harm intelligence security. Thus it should be released only if considerable gain is otherwise to be expected. Further, I doubt that a brief and guarded statement such as this would contribute greatly to clearing up any confusion which may remain, and therefore recommend against its release to the press.

Should Secretary Gates' judgment on this question be, in effect, that considerable gain is to be expected, and should he therefore decide to release the statement, the attached changes are recommended for accuracy.

SIGNED

C. F. CASSELL
General, USAF

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

(Via heading

Draft prepared by O/NE.
Final prepared in office of AO/NE
per She notified to
conform hold-back copies.

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DCI noted this after DDCI signature

and agreed to release as is. Per FMG

Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900050005-5
Orig & H w/attach to addressee via ER
Copies rec'd O/DCI, L-ONCI

with background. Done

Attachment to 1 17-11-6
11-11-67

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO STATEMENT ON INTELLIGENCE DEBATE

Last paragraph on page 1. Change to read:

Herein lies the numerical difference between the National Intelligence Estimate for this year, which envisages only one vigorous but orderly type of program, and the National Intelligence Estimate for last year, which envisaged the possibility of either an orderly or a "crash" program.

First paragraph on page 2, ninth line.

Change the word "confirmed" to "reaffirmed".

Last paragraph on page 2, continued on 3. Change to read:

Compared to the accelerated or "crash" figures included in the National Intelligence Estimate last year as a possibility, the figures now contained in the National Intelligence Estimate for 1960 and 1961 are significantly lower. If the figures included in last year's National Intelligence Estimate for the orderly program are compared to those included in this year's Estimate, the Soviet ICBM capability now estimated for 1960 and 1961 can be regarded as roughly comparable in number to that ^{previous} given in the estimate.



TOP SECRET

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
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

March 9, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: General C. P. Cabell
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Secretary Gates is extremely anxious to use the attached draft statement without classification, and has asked that I refer it to you or to Mr. Dulles with his request for concurrence in declassifying the attached draft.

Should this not be possible in its current form, it would be appreciated if it could be re-worked to permit its declassification.


George S. Brown
Brigadier General, USAF
Military Assistant

Attachment

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TS 172594
#1



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

March 7, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY GATES


The charge has been repeated several times recently that you misrepresented the intelligence information regarding the change in the relative ICBM strengths of the U. S. and the USSR this year compared with last.

We don't know how many people believe this charge; we believe quite a few thoughtful people are confused regarding the conflicting claims in this area and their confidence in the kind of facts they are getting may be shaken.

In the protection of the President, yourself, Mr. Dulles, and the reputation of our military leaders, I believe it important a clear layman's statement explaining this conflict be made. This can be used by you with the press, and by others of us called upon to comment on these charges.

STAT The attached statement has been revised only slightly since [redacted] of CIA, with the concurrence of Mr. Dulles, said they would be reluctant to declassify it. Since that time Congressman Mahon has referred to the "crash program", Jack Norris has discussed the matter in some detail in the Washington Post*, on the one hand; on the other, the opposition has continued its attempts to damage the prestige and reputation of both Mr. Dulles and yourself.

I would like to suggest that Mr. Dulles be asked to look at this statement again in the light of recent developments and see if either this statement cannot be declassified or if a few word changes cannot be made which would make it declassified.


O. M. Gale

Attachment

* Attached

STATEMENT ON INTELLIGENCE DEBATE

Last year we had available to us a National Intelligence Estimate which gave us the numbers of operational ICBM's which the USSR could achieve or might achieve in various time periods. These were calculated to cover either of two possibilities: one, that the Soviets would pursue a vigorous but orderly ICBM program, and the other, that they would pursue a highly accelerated or "crash" program.

This was the basis of the presentations made to the several Committees of Congress last year by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in evaluating the Russian ICBM threat.

Because either was possible, we felt obliged in the interests of national security to consider the possibility that the Soviets would do all they could do and we based our evaluation on the assumption that they would proceed with the highly accelerated or crash program.

A year has now passed. Additional information has been acquired and further refinement has been accomplished. Considering all the available evidence, we believe it is now well established that the USSR is not engaged in a crash program for ICBM development.

Herein lies the difference between the National Intelligence Estimate for this year and the National Intelligence Estimate for last year.

- 2 -

Even to the layman who has no classified information but has simply been watching developments in Russia, this should not come as a surprise. The eagerness of Khrushchev to overtake the United States as the number one industrial power of the world is obvious. The Soviet seven-year plan is simply one evidence of this desire. An all-out maximum acceleration program of missile production would clearly require the diversion of resources from other programs to which the Soviet Government has attached great importance. In addition, the Intelligence community has now confirmed that there is no indication that the Soviet Union has embarked upon an all-out maximum acceleration program of missile production.

Some have claimed that the National Intelligence Estimate regarding the Soviet strategic attack capability has been reduced since a year ago and others have claimed that it has not been reduced. The validity of these claims depend upon which of last year's figures are being considered -- those for the orderly or those for the accelerated program.

Compared to the accelerated figures included in the National Intelligence Estimate last year, the figures now contained in the National Intelligence Estimate for 1960 and 1961 are significantly lower.

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- 3 -

If the figures included in last year's National Intelligence Estimate for the orderly program are compared to those included in this year's Estimate, the Soviet ICBM capability in 1960 and 1961 could be regarded as about the same in number as previously estimated, or could be greater, depending upon whether one takes the maximum or the minimum figures contained in the present estimate.

However, the important thing to remember is that whether we take the estimate of a year ago or the current estimate, it is the firm judgment of our military and scientific advisors that our deterrent and retaliatory position remains adequate to meet the threat today and in the years ahead. That is to say, we do not foresee a time when the Soviets could launch an attack on us without inviting unacceptable damage to themselves in return.

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Vital Point Ignored on Missiles

By John G. Morris

Staff Reporter

Pentagon statements declaring America's missile posture vis-a-vis Russia has improved since last year apparently ignored the most important basis of comparison—the number of hydrogen-headed ICBMs expected to be on launchers and ready to fire.

This emerges from the confusion about the downgraded intelligence estimates which two Senate committees have been trying to clarify behind closed doors.

Long questioning of Central Intelligence Director Allen W. Dulles and Gen. Nathan F. Twining, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has brought out that Twining and Defense Secretary Thomas S. Gates Jr. were counting only missile-production figures or total inventories when they declared last month that the missile gap had "narrowed."

Twining, himself, declared at an open hearing before the combined Senate Space Committee and Senate Preparedness Subcommittee that the most "significant" basis for comparison is the number of ICBMs actually on launchers.

Missiles not on launchers are far less important because of the very nature of the weapon. They should be launched in salvo or near salvo to count, whether fired by an aggressor or a country striking back. There is unlikely to be time to set up missiles for firing once the bell rings.

Pentagon chiefs acknowledged in their testimony that construction of ICBM bases is the limiting factor in increasing United States missile strength. There are Atlas missiles in storage without launchers to

day and production of the weapon easily can be speeded.

And counting only missiles on launchers, Democratic Senators on the investigating committees say without contradiction, that the intelligence estimates show Russian ICBM superiority in the early 1960s may be greater than the 3-1 margin acknowledged last year by then Defense Secretary Neil H. McElroy.

Later information and improved intelligence do show that the U.S.S.R. is unlikely to build as many ICBMs in the next few years as was conceded possible last year or the year before. The estimated Soviet edge in total inventory of missiles is less than 3 to 1.

Here is where the argument over "capabilities" versus "intentions" gets into the complex picture. American intelligence estimated two years ago that the Russians, if they went ahead with a "crash" missile program, could have considerably more than a 3-1 superiority over what the United States planned to build.

Last year, the estimate was downgraded, because there were signs that Russian ICBM was not on such a "crash" basis. But this was not entirely clear. This year, the information is clearer that Moscow will not produce all the missiles it has the capacity to produce, perhaps because it wants to wait for improved missiles.

This is what Gates and Twining were saying last year when they said con-

month that the "gap had narrowed." Their aim seemed to be to convince critics that the Eisenhower Administration budget was adequate.

Later, CIA chief Dulles told Senators under questioning that intelligence estimates showed that counting only the number of ICBMs on launchers the "missile gap" picture had not improved.

Questioned about this, Twining said publicly that he had never seen last year's on-launcher intelligence chart that Dulles gave the Senate committees. The National Intelligence Estimate for 1959, furnished the Pentagon and top Government officials in January, 1959, did not give such a future estimate of Soviet missile strength for 1960-61-62, as did the estimate submitted in January of this year. It was brought out. Only U.S.S.R. production and inventory figures were included in last year's estimate, probably because the information on future "on-launcher" strength was not considered firm or reliable enough.

This provided an explanation of why Twining did not know what last year's less-than-firm intelligence estimates reported on this point and why he was able to say earlier that the "gap had narrowed."

But Twining also said under questioning in published testimony that he receives daily intelligence briefings on Russian missile and other military developments. He said he does not wait for or rely only on the once-a-year National In-

telligence Estimate in deciding policy.

The National Intelligence Estimates are prepared by the United States Intelligence Board, which is headed by Dulles. The intelligence chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Joint Chiefs of Staff are members.

Therefore, Twining's explanation has caused some robust eyebrows among the investigating Senators. If the "on-launcher" estimates are the most important, if Dulles has fit to give last year's estimate on this point is that: regardless of how firm it was and whether it was part of the annual national estimate, and if Twining receives daily briefings, how was such an important factor ignored when he and Gates testified the "gap had narrowed," they ask?

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

15 March 1960

Office of the Military Assistant, OSD
Room 3E 880, The Pentagon
Attention: Mrs. Alice Blake

In compliance with request from
Mr. Gale of your office, attached
is thermofax copy of "Statement on
Intelligence Debate" which was
received by General Cabell as
attachment to General Brown's letter
of 9 March 1960.


Secret


25X1

*(Thermofax #1 of Enclosure
to T.S. 172 594 from
as above - via ER - By hand.)*

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Cabell

The Director said he agrees with your
approach on this.

He feels that if the subject is left alone
for a while it may die down.


14 March 1960
(DATE)

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